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PRUDENT BUDGETARY POLICY 





The theory of tax smoothing and determination of public debt with uncertain future national 
income is extended for prudence. A prudent government deliberately underestimates future 
national income and the tax base, especially if the variance and persistence of shocks hitting 
the tax base are large and the tax rate and the unemployment benefit are large. As a precaution 
the tax rate is set higher and the level of public spending lower. As a result, as income and the 
tax base turn out to be bigger than budgeted, the minister of finance enjoys windfall revenues 
and is able to gradually reduce debt and debt service over time. This permits, depending on 
political preferences, either gradual cuts in the tax rate, gradual increases in government 
spending or a combination of both. It is easy to allow for government assets as well. Finally, 
political economy justifications are offered of why it is desirable to appoint a strong and 
pessimistic minister of finance. In particular, we show that prudence is able to offset the 
intertemporal spending, tax and debt biases resulting from the common-pool distortions. If 
the minister of finance and the prime minister are given as many voting rights as the spending 
ministers combined, the intratemporal  common-pool distortions of an excessively large 
public sector are eliminated as well. A strong and pessimistic minister of finance can thus 
control the impatient profligacy of squabbling spending ministers. However, if voters care 
about outcomes on election eve, prudence may be abused for short-run electoral gains. 
Opportunistic manipulation of election results, however, also dampens the intertemporal 
common-pool distortions. 
JEL Code: H21, H60. 
Keywords: prudence, pessimism, precautionary taxation, tax smoothing, public debt, income 
forecasts, public sector assets, common pool, feedback Nash, voting rights, electoral budget 
cycles, political economy. 
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This paper is inspired by my former colleague Gerrit Zalm, who was Minister of Finance 
during 1994-2007 and initiator of the concept of prudent budgetary policy in the Netherlands. 
It is also a requiem, since the new administration has abandoned this policy. I thank Lans 
Bovenberg, Robert Dur, Ferd Crone, Bas Jacobs, Mark Roscam Abbing, Steven Poelhekke, 
Paul Tang and Sweder van Wijnbergen for helpful comments on an earlier version.   1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The reputation of any good minister of finance is based on prudence and caution. Nobody wants a 
spend-thrift keeper of the national budget. A good minister of finance will be forgiven if he gets 
unexpected windfall revenues, but will be scorned if the budget turns out year after year to be 
worse than expected. Just as the electorate prefers to appoint an ultraconservative central banker 
as demonstrated by Rogoff (1985), one would rather have a conservative minister of finance. The 
difference  is  that  a  central  banker  should  be  curbed  as  he  may  try  to  renege  on  previous 
announcements to keep the money supply in check while the minister of finance may be under 
pressure from his spending ministers to relax budgetary discipline. Intuitively, it thus makes sense 
to  appoint  a  slightly  pessimistic  rather  than  an  optimistic  minister  of  finance.  This  insight 
underlies the advice of the so-called Studiegroep Begrotingsruimte and inspired the practice in 
the Netherlands since 1994 of deliberately underestimating future growth in the national income 
by  a  say  a  quarter  or  half  percent  in  order  to  err  on  the  safe  side  and  not  be  surprised  by 
unexpected worsening of the public finances.
1 The main objective of this paper is to formalize 
this  notion  of  prudent  budgetary  policy  within  the  context  of  Barro’s  (1979)  theory  of  tax 
smoothing and optimal debt management and to provide a political economy rationale for it. 
We thus allow for precautionary behaviour of the minister of finance. The objective is to 
minimize  the  expected  value  of  an  exponential  transformation  of  the  quadratic  welfare  loss 
criterion, which itself depends on the sum of tax rates squared. The coefficient of the exponential 
transformation corresponds to an Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, which we call 
the degree of prudence. Within the context of a linear model and additive normally distributed 
errors, the optimal policy rules are linear with reaction coefficients that depend on the variances 
and covariances of the stochastic processes driving the state variables. Prudence implies that the 
policy maker plays a min-max game against nature. The policy maker hedges against undesirable 
outcomes by postulating that shocks damage its objectives even though, from a purely statistical 
point of view, they do not hurt on average.  
Our key insight is that a prudent minister of finance deliberately underestimates future 
forecasts of national income and the tax base. As a precaution the tax rate is set higher and the 
level of public spending lower than without prudence. As a result, even though budgeted tax rates 
are smoothed over time, expected values of the tax rate gradually fall and/or expected levels of 
governments spending increase over time as the inevitable windfall revenues materialize and the 
                                                 
1 The new government has in 2007 abandoned prudent forecasts of national income and tax bases. Instead, 
it claims to be prudent by pursuing a more ambitious target for the final financial surplus.   2 
level of government debt and thus debt service fall over time. We show that the extent to which 
this happens is greater if the degree of risk aversion (or prudence) of the minister of finance, the 
variance and persistence of shocks hitting the national income and the tax base, and the level of 
the  tax  rate  and  the  unemployment  benefit  are  relatively  large.  In  the  very  long  run  the 
government builds up assets to generate sufficient interest revenue to pay for public spending, so 
that the expected tax rate asymptotically goes to zero.  
Another objective of this paper is to offer insights into why a minister of finance wants to 
implement a prudent budgetary policy. One reason is based on the reality of cabinet decision 
making. If there are unexpected falls in public revenue, spending ministers spend lots of time and 
energy fighting over who has to implement the spending cuts to balance the budget and the 
minister of finance is under great pressure to relax the budgetary rules. This is not conducive to 
good government. Too much time and energy is wasted on squabbling rather than on necessary 
reforms  and  cracking  necessary  tough  political  decisions.  It  is  therefore  desirable  to  have  a 
prudent budgetary policy, so that on average unexpected windfall revenues are more likely than 
shortfalls in  expected revenues. Another justification  of  why  a  minister  of  finance has  more 
prudent preferences than the electorate is that ex ante the minister of finance realizes that ex post 
it will be hard to discipline the spending ministers in his cabinet. Profligate spending ministers 
and a weak minister of finance give rise to a common-pool problem. This results in an upward 
bias in public spending claims, a tilt of the government spending profile from the future towards 
the present and of the tax profile from the present to the future, and thus excessive accumulation 
of government debt as in Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 13) and Velasco (2000). We show 
that it is in the interest of society to appoint a relative prudent minister of finance, which can 
offset the intertemporal spending, tax and debt biases resulting from the common-pool problem.
2 
If in addition the minister of finance has the unequivocal backing of the prime minister and has at 
least as many votes in the cabinet as the spending ministers combined, he also has sufficient 
power to overcome intratemporal biases resulting in an excessively large public sector.  
Section II sets up the traditional intertemporal theory of tax smoothing and determination 
of public debt and shows that government borrowing is warranted for temporary increases in 
government spending and to cover the temporary loss of tax revenues in a recession. Section III 
extends this framework to allow for a prudent minister of finance and derives our key insight 
about underestimating the tax base and the principle of precautionary taxation. Section IV allows 
                                                 
2 We show that prudence offsets the intertemporal distortions caused by wanting public spending now 
rather than tomorrow and postponing taxation, but not the intratemporal distortions leading to a too large 
public sector. More precisely, prudence moves the feedback towards the open-loop Nash equilibrium.   3 
for endogenous government spending and unemployment benefits and addresses the question of 
whether windfall revenues should be used for debt reduction, tax cuts or public spending hikes. 
The appendix extends prudent budgetary policy for endogenous public investment and public 
sector assets as well as public debt. Section V offers some political economy justifications of why 
it is desirable to appoint a pessimistic minister of finance and to give the minister of finance more 
voting rights in the cabinet. Section V also heeds a warning that prudence may be abused for 
short-term electoral gains. Section VI concludes and offers suggestions for further research. 
 
 
II. USING PUBLIC DEBT TO SMOOTH TAX DISTORTIONS 
 
We  follow  Barro  (1979)  and  abstract  from  general  equilibrium  effects.  Here  we  restate  the 
traditional theory of tax smoothing to set the scene for our discussion of prudent budgetary policy 
rules in section III-V. The government budget constraint is given by: 
 
(1)  Dt = (1+r*) Dt-1 + Gt - tt Yt,    D0 given, 
 
where Dt, Gt and Yt of denote, respectively, government debt, government spending and national 
income at time t, and r* is the exogenous real interest rate. With g indicating the trend rate of real 
economic growth, we rewrite (1) in terms of fractions of the trend level of national income: 
 
(1¢)  dt = b dt-1 + gt - tt yt,   d0 =D0/Y0 given,   b º (1+r*)/(1+g) > 1, 
 
where dt º Dt /[(1+g)
t Y0], gt º Gt /[(1+g)
t Y0], yt º Yt /[(1+g)
t Y0] and b is the (gross) growth-
corrected  real  interest  rate.  The  no-Ponzi  condition  implies  that  the  present  value  of  future 
primary surpluses must at least cover the current government debt:
3 
 
(2)  ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 lim 0          .
s s
t s t s t s t s t s
s t
d y g d b b t
¥
- -
- + - + - + - + - ®¥
=
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Tax distortions are proportional to the square of the tax rate, so the government minimizes:
4 
                                                 
3 See Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Trehan and Walsh (1988), Ahmed and Rogers (1995), Quintos (1995) 
Bohn (1998) and Afonso (2005) for various unit-root and co-integration tests of whether the no-Ponzi 
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subject to the present-value budget constraint (2). The optimality conditions imply that tax rates 
are  smoothed  over  time,  i.e.,  tt  =  tt-1.This  together  with  (2)  yields  the  following  familiar 
expressions for the government financial deficit and the tax rate: 
 
(4)  1 1 ( ) ( )    and     [ ( 1) ]/ ,
P P P P
t t t t t t t t t t t d d g g y y g d y t t b - - - = - - - = + -  
 
where the permanent values of detrended government spending and national income are given by, 
respectively, 
1 1 ( 1)   and   ( 1) .
P t s P t s
t s t s
s t s t
g g y y b b b b
¥ ¥
- - - -
= =
º - º - ￿ ￿  
 
We thus see that temporary increases in public spending (e.g., caused by a war) are financed by 
running up a government debt. In contrast, permanent increases in public spending are financed 
by an increase in the tax rate. Future increases in government spending (e.g., due to graying of the 
population)  imply  that  the  permanent  level  of  public  spending  exceeds  the  current  level  of 
government spending, so the government brings down debt and debt service to pay for higher 
public spending in the future. Also, a recession characterized by a temporary fall in national 
income induces the government to run up public debt. Permanent increases in national income 
imply sustained increases in the tax base and thus allow for a cut in the tax rate. 
 
 
III. PRECAUTIONARY TAXATION AND DEBT MANAGEMENT WITH 
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT FUTURE INCOME AND TAX BASES 
 
To  modify  the  traditional  theory  of  tax  smoothing  discussed  in  section  II  for  prudence,  the 
government maximizes the expected value of an exponential transformation of criterion (3): 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Our framework can be given micro foundations if we assume that utility is quasi-linear and the utility of 
money is constant, labour supply and output are exogenous, production losses resulting from tax collection 
are proportional to the square of the tax rate, and households cannot accumulate assets. If we also assume 
that the government can borrow on the world markets against a given interest rate r, and the wage follows 
from the factor price frontier, expression (3) for the social welfare loss corresponds to the aggregate utility 
loss of households and the present-value budget constraint (2) is justified. One also gets a linear-quadratic 
framework with no tax collection losses if the disutility of work is quadratic in labour supply.   5 
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and q >0 indicates the degree of prudence or caution of the policymaker. The risk-neutral 














￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
- ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   as  q®0.  Two  governments  may 
share the same welfare criterion under certainty, but their aversion to risk may differ. To 
capture this, the government maximizes the expected value of U(G) º -exp(-q G). The 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion with respect to the criterion G, i.e., q º -U²/U¢>0, 
also  captures  prudence  in  the  sense  of  Kimball  (1990),  since  U¢²=q
3  exp(-q  G)>0. 
Prudence implies the willingness to avoid shocks with adverse consequences.  
We assume an AR(1) process for deviations of national income from trend where 




1 1 ,    IN(0, ),   1 t t t t t y y r r e e s r - = - + + < ￿ . 
 
Temporary shocks to national income correspond to r = 0 and permanent shocks to r = 1. It is 
straightforward to allow for more general ARMA-processes for national income and the tax base 
than (4). We work with a first-order Taylor-series expansion of (1¢): 
 
(1²)  dt = b dt-1 + gt -tt -t (yt - 1),   d0 =D0/Y0 given, 
 
where  t  indicates  the  long-run  tax  rate  around  which  the  government  budget  constraint  is 
linearized. The government maximizes (3) subject to the government budget constraint (1²) and 
the stochastic process generating deviations of national income from trend (4). We assume that 
the variance of the stochastic shocks to detrended national income rise with the growth-corrected 
real interest rate. Hence, we have 
2 2 t
t s s b =  where s is the standard deviation of e0. This ensures 
that the feature of time inconsistency occurring in linear-quadratic problems with temporal risk 
aversion and time discounting (van der Ploeg, 1993; Bommier, 2006) is eliminated. Applying the 
results on risk-sensitive optimal LQG-control of Speyer, Deyst and Jacobson (1974) or Whittle   6 
(1981, 1990), we see that our framework yields analytically tractable closed-form solutions. The 
government effectively plays a game against nature and solves:
5 
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- ￿  subject to (1²) and (4).  
 
The government thus chooses the tax rate to minimize this min-max criterion and assumes the 
worst by postulating that the national income disturbances are drawn in a way that maximizes this 
criterion. The parameter q thus indicates a degree of pessimism.  
 
The optimality conditions corresponding to the min-max problem (5) from the perspective of time 
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where the superscript B denotes the budgeted rather than mathematically expected outcomes. The 
second difference equation for the budgeted shocks is unstable, since |b/r| > 1. Given that (6) also 
requires that the budgeted tax rates are smoothed over time, the budgeted underestimation of the 
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It follows from (7) that the extent by which the minister of finance underestimates shocks to the 
data  generating  process  for  the  tax  base  is  large  if  he  is  relatively  prudent,  variances  and 
persistence  of  shocks  are  large,  and  the  tax  rate  is  high.  Our  framework  deviates  from  the 
certainty equivalence principle which sets  0,
B
s s t e = " ³  and is valid only if q = 0. Substituting 
(7) into (4) and solving for the budgeted national income and tax base yields: 
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5 See section VI for a derivation in a more general setting with endogenous government spending.   7 
Upon substitution of (8) into the present-value budget constraint (2), we can solve for the tax rate: 
 
(9) 
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Upon substitution of (9) back into the government budget constraint (1¢), we obtain the expected 
mutation in the debt-GDP ratio (i.e., the expected growth-corrected public sector deficit): 
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The key insight is thus that a prudent minister of finance underestimates future GDP and thus 
underestimates the future tax base and tax revenues. As a consequence, the minister sets a higher 
tax  rate just to be  on  the safe  side. This  may  be  referred  to  as  precautionary  taxation. The 
statistically speaking inevitable future windfall revenues permit gradual reductions in public debt 
and thus also gradual reductions in debt service and the tax rate (on top of any gradual debt 
reductions necessary to finance efficiently projected increases in government spending). Hence, 
prudence implies a departure from the principle of tax smoothing. 
 
CASE: TEMPORARY SHOCKS 
The case of temporary shocks corresponds to r = 0 and yt = 1 + et. It follows that the minister of 
finance deliberately budgets future levels of national income and the tax base that are lower than 
the statistically expected value of national income and the tax base: 
 
(8¢) 
2 2 1 ( ) 1   if    0.
B B
t t y qs t t qs = - < >  
 
We see that the expected deficit is less than the temporary level of government spending or the 
expected surplus is greater than is warranted by projected increases in government spending, 
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We note that temporary shocks in national income do not affect the level of taxation, but do affect 
the  deficit.  In  other  words,  a  temporary  fallback in the  national  income  and the  tax  base is 
accommodated by a higher deficit, not by a higher tax rate. 
 
CASE: PERMANENT SHOCKS 
The tax rate and expected budget deficit for a prudent minister of finance facing permanent 
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In contrast to temporary shocks, permanent shocks to the national income and the tax base are 
accommodated by the tax rate. A permanent fall in national income thus induces a permanent 
increase in the tax rate and no change in the deficit. The correction for prudence is much greater 
for permanent than temporary shocks, so that the precautionary level of taxation is higher.  
 
In general, we see from (7) that a higher degree of persistence of stochastic shocks to the national 
income implies that the budgeted underestimation of the tax base is larger. Persistent shocks thus 
make a minister of finance more prudent. The higher the degree of persistence of shocks to the 
national income and the tax base (higher r), the higher the extent of precautionary taxation and 
the higher the resulting reductions in government debt. 
   9 
 
IV. PRUDENT BUDGETARY POLICY WITH ENDOGENOUS PUBLIC SPENDING 
 
In practice, ministers of finance must deal with the issue of endogenous government spending and 
the bill for unemployment benefits. They also have to answer the question of whether windfall 
revenues arising from a prudent budgetary policy should be used for debt reduction, tax cuts or 
public spending hikes. We thus replace the government budget constraint (1¢) by: 
 
(11)  dt = b dt-1 + gt + bt [u + a (1 - yt)] - tt yt » b dt-1 + gt + u bt - tt + (t+ab) (1 - yt), 
d0 =D0/Y0 given,   b º (1+r)/(1+g) > 1, a > 0, 
 
where bt indicates the level of the unemployment benefit, b stands for the long-run value of the 
unemployment benefit, and u denotes the equilibrium level of unemployment. Okun’s law states 
that a (1 - yt) + u captures the level of unemployment.
6 With a positive effect of pure public 
goods on social welfare, the criterion that needs to be maximized subject to the (linearized) 
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where  0 t t g g > >  indicates the bliss level of public spending and c > 0 denotes the relative 
priority attached to higher public spending rather than lower tax rates. The optimum min-max 
outcome is characterized by smoothing of the tax rate as before, by smoothing of shortfalls of 
public spending from its bliss value, and by a budgeted data generating process for the errors in 
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Using the same arguments as in section 3, we find that the budgeted error in the data generating 
process for the tax base is larger than before: 
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The degree of underestimation of the tax base is thus also large if the level of the unemployment 
benefit is large. The higher the tax rate and the unemployment benefit level, the more sensitive 
tax revenues are to business cycle variations and thus the more prudent the minister finance has to 
be. In addition to the dynamic efficiency conditions, the optimum must also satisfy the following 
static efficiency condition: 
 
(12)  ( ).
B B
t t t g g t c = -  
 
The marginal cost of a higher budgeted tax rate must thus equal the marginal benefit of a higher 
level of public spending. In other words, a high tax rate or cost of public funds implies a low 
demand for public goods. Upon substituting (8²) and (12) into the present-value government 
budget constraint and solving for the optimal tax level of public spending and tax rate, we obtain: 
 
(13) 
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t b   indicates  the  permanent  level  of  the  unemployment  benefit.  If  one  expects  the 
unemployment benefit rate to be cut in the future, it is optimal to set a relatively low tax rate and   11 
run a temporary deficit. Endogenous government spending does not affect the determination of 
public debt very much, except that more right-wing governments with a lower value of c tend to 
have lower tax rates and thus their correction term for prudence is smaller as well. We see from 
(12) that now not only do we have as a precaution a higher tax rate, but also a lower level of 
public spending. Over time the minister of finance will inevitably enjoy windfall revenues, so that 
the tax rate gradually falls and the level of public spending gradually increases as debt service 
diminishes. Figure 1 shows what happens with a permanent fall in the level of national income. 
 
FIGURE 1: PRUDENT REACTION TO PERMANENT FALL IN THE TAX BASE 
 
On impact the tax rate is higher and the level of public spending is lower than in the absence of 
prudence. As a result, on average the government can expect windfall revenues that enable debt 
to  be  paid  off.  The  accompanying  fall  in  interest  payments  permit  a  gradual  rise  in  public 
spending and fall in the tax rate. In the very long run the government builds up assets in order to 
generate just sufficient interest revenue to pay for each period for the long-run level of public 
spending. This implies, in sharp contrast to the traditional tax smoothing result of Barro (1979), 
that the tax rate converges asymptotically to zero.  
Since many European governments have tried to satisfy the Maastricht norms for the 
deficit-GDP and the debt-GDP ratios by selling public sector assets, it is interesting to extend our 
analysis to allow for public sector capital (see appendix). The present-value government budget 
constraint now states that the net worth of the public sector must be sufficient to cover the excess 
debt q = 0 
debt q > 0 
tax rate q = 0 
tax rate q > 0 
spending q = 0 
spending q > 0 
time 
national income 
   12 
of public spending plus losses on public sector capital over tax revenues as in Buiter (1985). 
Selling public sector capital and using the proceeds to reduce government debt therefore does not 
necessarily improve the net worth of the public sector. Although the current financial deficit 
improves, any future income or utility derived from these public sector assets will be forsaken. 
The key insight is that prudence induces precautionary taxation and underspending of public 
goods and public sector capital. As a result, the net worth of the public sector increases over time 
and  the  government  can  be  expected  to  gradually  lower  the  tax  burden  and  gradually  raise 
spending on consumption goods and capital. 
 
 
V. CASE FOR A STRONG AND PESSIMISTIC MINISTER OF FINANCE? 
 
If the electorate itself is prudent, it makes sense for a benevolent government to be prudent as 
well. In practice, there are also political reasons why a government might want to employ a more 
prudent budgetary policy than its citizens. Let us therefore assume that household preferences do 
not display temporal risk aversion and see whether there may nevertheless be a reason for the 
government to act prudently. Governments want to spend as much of their time and energy on 
important and necessary economic and political reforms and cannot afford to spend their time and 
energy on useless matters. However, whenever there are unexpected falls in public revenues, 
ministers taking care of the spending departments fight over who must implement the spending 
cuts to balance the budget and the minister of finance is pressurized to relax the budgetary rules. 
In contrast, if there are windfall revenues, the cabinet members find it easier to agree on what to 
do with them. The government therefore finds it attractive to have a prudent budgetary policy, so 
that on average unexpected windfall revenues occur more frequently than shortfalls in expected 
revenues and more time and energy is left for important political issues. 
 
Another justification highlights why it is attractive to appoint a strong minister of finance with 
more pessimistic preferences than the electorate and his spending colleagues. Ex ante the minister 
of finance realizes that ex post it is tougher to discipline the spending ministers in his cabinet. If 
the minister of finance is not in firm control, the unfettered claims of the spending ministers give 
rise to a common-pool problem. This implies an upward bias in public spending and excessive 
accumulation of government debt as discussed in Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 13.1 and   13 
13.2).
7 It also leads to a departure from tax smoothing, since spending ministers try to defer 
taxation. Such biases occur as each spending minister is trying to get its hands on scarce public 
revenue before the other spending ministers get a chance to do so. Given these spending, tax and 
debt  biases,  the  minister  of  finance  may  find  it  especially  advantageous  to  deliberately 
underestimate the future tax base and induce precautionary taxation and underspending. More 
precisely, a minister of finance can strengthen his position in the cabinet by implementing a 
pessimistic budgetary policy to offset the biases resulting from the common-pool problem. It is 
thus in the interest of society to appoint a prudent minister of finance. 
To  make  the  point,  we  allow for N  spending  ministers. To  keep matters  simple,  we 
abstract from public sector capital and unemployment benefits and assume only two time periods. 
If there is no inherited debt and the rate of interest and the discount rate are zero, we have e1 = d0 










d g g t t te e s
= =
= - = + - ￿ ￿ ￿  
 
where gti stands for the level of spending by minister i at time t. We focus on symmetric outcomes 
and  assume  that  priorities  and  bliss  values  are  time-invariant  and  the  same  for  each  public 
spending category, so that minister i is concerned with minimizing the expected welfare loss: 
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The minister of finance minimizes the expected value of the sum of the welfare loss functions of 
each of the spending ministers and also postulates that future disturbances are drawn to hurt 
social welfare. We first consider the cooperative outcome, where the minister of finance and the 
spending ministers jointly minimize the expected value of the social welfare loss L1 + .. + LN 
subject  to  (15)  in  the  absence  of  prudence.  We  then  contrast  this  with  the  non-cooperative 
                                                 
7  Von  Hagen  and  Harden  (1995)  argue  that  the  spending  bias  resulting  from  fiscal  illusion  (i.e.,  the 
overestimation of the benefit of a particular activity) may be contained by appropriate budgetary processes, 
which  depend  on  what  kind  of  uncertainty  dominates  the  budget  process.  Another  way  to  constrain 
profligate spending ministers is to delegate authority to monitor and punish to the minister of finance. 
Hallerberg  and  von  Hagen  (1997)  argue  that  this  works  better  in  countries  with  non-proportional 
representation  and  one-party  states.  Swank  (2002)  shows  that  the  appointment  of  a  spending-averse 
minister of finance is better than binding budget targets imposed by the prime minister, because it induces 
spending ministers to propose less ambitious budgets as well as to appoint less spending-prone bureaucrats.   14 
outcome in the absence of prudence where spending ministers lead in their spending claims and 
the minister of finance follows in setting the tax rate and public debt. We show that the non-
cooperative outcome leads to the following distortions: a tilt towards future rather than present 
taxation,  a  tilt  towards  present  rather  than  future  government  consumption,  excessive 
accumulation of government debt, and an upward bias in total public spending and the average 
tax  rate.  We  finally  analyze  what  happens if  a  strong  and  pessimistic  minister  of  finance  is 
appointed to control the squabbling spending ministers. A strong minister of finance is necessary 
to  overcome  the  intratemporal  bias  towards  excessive  public  spending  while  a  pessimistic 
minister of finance is necessary to mitigate the intertemporal bias of spending too soon and 
taxing too late. A strong minister of finance effectively has as much power as all his spending 
colleagues together. Precautionary taxation allows for a gradual reduction in government debt. It 
also  leads  on  average  to  expected  windfall  revenues,  so  that  over  time  the  level  of  public 
spending can rise and the tax rate can fall. Prudence is thus able to offset the intertemporal 
distortions arising from the dynamic common-pool problem. 
 
COOPERATIVE OUTCOME 
It is easy to show that the cooperative outcome in the absence of prudence is characterized by: 
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where superscript C indicates the cooperative outcome. It is optimal ex ante for the social planner 
to smooth the levels of public spending and the tax rate over time. Since there are no changes in 
the targets for government spending or the tax base over time, there is no need for government 
debt. A bigger priority to public goods c leads to higher spending and tax rates. 
 
OPEN-LOOP NASH OUTCOME 
One  way  to  calculate  the  non-cooperative  outcome  is  to  assume  pre-commitment  of  each 
spending minister to future spending levels. The resulting open-loop Nash equilibrium is: 
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where the superscript O indicates the open-loop Nash outcome. In the non-cooperative outcome 
with pre-commitment, we see that spending and tax rates are higher than in the cooperative 
outcome. Since spending ministers are only concerned with their own budget, they do not take 
fully account of the tax distortions caused by the total budget. Tax rates and public spending 
levels are smoothed, so there is no need for government debt. Hence, there are no intertemporal 
distortions, only intratemporal distortions in the open-loop Nash outcome. It is easy to see that, if 
the minister of finance and the prime minister together get just as much votes as the spending 
ministers  combined,  the  open-loop  Nash  outcome  becomes  the  cooperative  outcome  and  the 
intratemporal distortions leading to an excessively large public sector are eliminated. 
 
FEEDBACK NASH OUTCOME 
It is more realistic to assume that there is no pre-commitment in which case the feedback Nash 
outcome is appropriate. We use dynamic programming to ensure subgame perfection. Working 
backwards  each  spending  minister  takes  past  government  debt  and  spending  plans  of  his 
colleagues as given. Minister i thus solves in the second period:  
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where we have substituted the second-period budget constraint from (15). The optimal reaction 




















so that he spends more if there is a small outstanding debt and a positive income shocks. If his 
colleagues spend more, the cost of funds goes up and he spends less. The resulting symmetric 
feedback Nash equilibrium for the second-period level of spending and the tax rate is given by: 
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where the superscript N indicates the feedback Nash outcome. Turning to the first period and 
substituting the first part of (15) and (21) into (16) , we see that minister i chooses first-period 
spending to minimize its welfare loss: 
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The finance minister chooses the tax rate t1 to minimize L1 + .. + LN . The resulting first-order 
conditions are: 
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This states that the marginal cost of taxation must equal the marginal benefit of public goods in 
the first period and also equal the marginal cost of public debt (i.e., the marginal cost of lower 
spending and higher taxes in the future). The resulting symmetric feedback Nash equilibrium 
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Due  to  the  linear-quadratic-Gaussian  nature  of  the  optimization  problem  and  the  absence  of 
prudence, certainty equivalence applies so optimal first-period spending and debt can be obtained 
by setting the future income shock to its expected value of zero. Upon substitution of (24) into 
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As long as N > 1, we can easily establish the following results:.  
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From (25) and (21¢) we see that the feedback Nash outcome suffers from two types of distortions. 
First, the sum of spending levels and of the tax rate over the two periods is the same as in the 
open-loop Nash equilibrium and thus higher than in the cooperative outcome. This is the familiar 
intratemporal distortion towards an excessive public sector. Second, government consumption is 
tilted towards the first period, taxation is tilted towards the second period, and, as a consequence, 
there is excessive government debt. These are the intertemporal distortions. In fact, spending in 
the first period is bigger in the feedback Nash than in the cooperative outcome.
8 Because each 
spending minister (or group of a coalition) decides part of the budget and nobody controls the 
aggregate budgetary outcome, ministers spend too much and too soon and postpone taxation with 
the result that borrowing is too high. These two types of common-pool distortions arise from the 
lack of a proper definition of property rights to tax revenues.  
It is interesting to note that the common-pool distortions worsen when the number of 
spending ministers increases. More claims on the common budget worsen the biases to spend too 
much and too soon and postpone taxation. Also, comparing (21¢) with (17), a positive shock to 
national  income  induces  a  smaller  increase  in  public  spending  and  the  tax  rate  in  the  non-
cooperative outcome. Finally, the expected welfare loss is obviously greater in the feedback Nash 
than in the open loop Nash and a fortiori than in the cooperative outcome. 
 
PRUDENCE CAN HELP TO CONTROL PROFLIGATE SPENDING MINISTERS 
Now we introduce prudence into the feedback Nash outcome and show that this can improve 
social welfare. This implies that the cabinet deliberately depresses the forecast of future national 
income and the tax base. The finance minister is pessimistic and solves the min-max problem: 
 
                                                 
8 Also, if c(2c+N) > N
2, we establish that  2 1 2 E( ) .
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This gives rise to the following first-order conditions: 
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Using (23¢) and (21¢) to substitute expressions for all variables in terms of t1 into the present-
value budget constraint yields the following expressions for the first-period tax rate and level of 
spending, public debt and the future budgeted income shock: 
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where superscript P indicates the prudent outcome. Expression (27) indicates that the minister of 
finance deliberately underestimates future income to be on the safe side. Second-period public 
spending and the tax rate follow readily from the second-period government budget constraint: 
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To understand how prudence and a strong minister of finance can offset the intertemporal and 
intratemporal common-pool distortions, Table 1 calculates feedback Nash outcomes for varying 
degrees of prudence and compares them with the cooperative and open-loop and feedback Nash   19 
outcomes  in  the  absence  of  prudence.  The  open-loop  Nash  equilibrium  only  suffers  from 
intratemporal distortions: governments spending and tax rates are higher than in the cooperative 
outcome, but there is no excessive debt accumulation. To get rid of the bias in the open-loop 
Nash equilibrium it suffices to give the minister of finance at least as many votes in the cabinet as 
the spending ministers combined (i.e., reduce c to c/N). The feedback Nash outcome gives rise to 
the intertemporal distortions of spending too soon and taxing too late. It thus leads to excessive 
debt accumulation. Prudent budgetary policy clearly is able to offset the bias of spending too 
much and too soon and the resulting debt bias. By deliberately budgeting the future national 
income and tax revenues too low, the minister of finance forces his spending colleagues to spend 
later, to not postpone taxation and accumulate less debt. As the degree of prudence q increases, it 
is optimal to spend less today and more tomorrow, to borrow less and to have a lower tax rate. If 
qs
2 is about 0.35, the debt bias completely disappears and the feedback Nash outcome with 
prudence has become close to the open-loop Nash outcome. The final rows show that with a 
strong  and  even  more  pessimistic  minister  of  finance  it  is  possible  to  mitigate  all  the 
intratemporal and intertemporal welfare losses arising from the common-pool problem. 
 
 
TABLE 1: PRUDENCE AND STRONG FINANCE MINISTER 
MITIGATE THE COMMON-POOL PROBLEM 
 
    Ng1i   Ng2i       d1      t1      t2      2
B e      Li 
Cooperative  0.3333  0.3333  0  0.3333  0.3333  0  0.2 
Open-loop Nash  0.4286  0.4286  0  0.4286  0.4286  0  0.2204 
Feedback Nash  0.4418  0.4154  0.0462  0.3956  0.4615  0  0.2217 
Prudent qs
2t = 0.1  0.4386  0.4186  0.0350  0.4036  0.4536  -0.0807  0.2212 
Prudent qs
2t = 0.2  0.4352  0.4219  0.0233  0.4119  0.4452  -0.1648  0.2207 
Prudent qs
2t=0.35  0.4300  0.4272  0.0050  0.4250  0.4321  -0.2975  0.2204 
Prudent qs
2t= 0.4  0.4282  0.4292  -0.0014  0.4296  0.4275  -0.3437  0.2204 
Strong and prudent 
c = 2.5, qs
2t= 0.4 
c = 2.5, qs






















Parameters: t = g  = 0.3, c = 5 and N = 2. 
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WARNING: PRUDENCE MAY SOLICIT ELECTORAL BUDGET CYCLES 
Many governments adopt a ‘first-sour-then-sweet’ policy whereby unpopular policies such as 
raising tax rates and trimming public spending are implemented immediately upon election into 
office while popular policies of cutting tax rates and boosting public spending occur just before 
the next election. There may be short-run political benefits from loosening budgetary discipline 
just before an election, but only if citizens are myopic.
9 Such opportunistic political manipulation 
is made possible by the assets accumulated from precautionary taxation. By reducing government 
debt and accumulating assets, the minister of finance builds up a buffer that can be used to cut 
taxes and boost public spending towards election eve. As long as this is not overdone, electoral 
cycle motivations may help to offset the intertemporal common-pool distortions of spending too 
soon and taxing too late. However, there is always the danger that excessively large buffers are 
accumulated by the minister of finance in order to dish out excessively big tax cuts and spending 
hikes on election eve for short-run political gains.
10 Short-run political manipulation of election 
results may thus lead to an excessively prudent budgetary policy. To see this, we change the 
weight  on  second-period welfare  losses  in  (16)  from  1  to  1+p  with  p>0  and  recalculate  the 
outcomes of Table 1. It is easy to show that this induces an electoral business cycle with higher 
taxes and lower spending upon moving into office and lower taxes and higher spending just 
before the next election. Clearly, the government has an incentive to build up assets towards 
election eve in order to dish out favours to the voters. Table 2 confirms these results and indicates 
that for small values of p it is possible to have a welfare improvement, but for large values of p 
opportunistic political manipulation is excessive and leads a deterioration of welfare. In other 
words, if the electorate ‘forgets’ past outcomes quickly, electoral budget cycles are more likely to 
reduce  welfare.  Short-run    manipulation  of  election  outcomes  ensures,  like  prudence,  more 
                                                 
9 The pioneering work of Nordhaus (1976) on the political business cycle is based on myopic citizens. 
Opportunistic,  pre-election  manipulation  of  the  expectations-augmented  Phillips  curve  creates  jobs  on 
election eve while the inflationary effects appear after the election. Apart from not fitting the empirical 
facts very well as discussed by Drazen (2000), it is unlikely that people are foolish and irrational enough to 
be manipulated in such a way. Also, electoral cycles seem to be driven more by fiscal policy than monetary 
policy. Rogoff (1990) rationalized such opportunistic, pre-electoral manipulation by assuming that there is 
imperfect information about an incumbent’s competence. In such a context expansionary policy before an 
election indicates high competence. Partisan differences about the size of the public sector or the nature of 
public goods can also induce a pre-election debt bias; e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 13.3). 
10 Indeed, the ‘prudent’ finance minister Gerrit Zalm has been accused of being tough in post-election years 
but exuberant and irresponsible in each pre-election year. Critics such as Jacobs (2007) and Beetsma and 
van  Wijnbergen  (2007)  argue  that  under  his  reign  the  structural  deficit  and  volatility  of  output  and 
consumption have increased, but that he was ‘saved’ by the extra gas revenues resulting from temporary 
high oil prices. Minister Zalm may thus have abused his ‘prudent’ budgetary policy for short-run electoral 
gains. The same critics complain that minister Zalm has in election years immediately converted temporary 
windfall revenues in permanent tax cuts (1998, 2005) or public spending hikes (2001).   21 
effective  political  decision  making  and  makes  it  possible  to  control  squabbling  spending 
ministers, but not if the reduction of public debt or the accumulated assets induce excessive 
electoral budget cycles to the detriment of social welfare. If the effective discount rate of the past 
by the electorate equals 1/1.1666 = 0.857, the opportunistic electoral outcome exactly reproduces 
the open-loop Nash outcome. In that case, the intertemporal common-pool distortions are exactly 
offset by opportunistic manipulation of election results. 
 
TABLE 2: OPPORTUNISTIC MANUPILATION OF ELECTION OUTCOMES 
    Ng1i   Ng2i       d1      t1     t2      Li 
Open loop Nash  0.4286  0.4286  0  0.4286  0.4286  0.2204 
Feedback Nash  0.4418  0.4154  0.0462  0.3956  0.4615  0.2217 
Electoral p = 0.1  0.4336  0.4235  0.0176  0.4160  0.4412  0.2206 
Electoral p = 0.5  0.4071  0.4500  -0.0750  0.4821  0.3750  0.2239 
Electoral p=0.1666  0.4286  0.4286  0.0000  0.4286  0.4286  0.2204 
Parameters: t = g  = 0.3, c = 5 and N = 2. 
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The principles of sound prudent budgetary policy require  that the minister of finance deliberately 
underestimates the future level of the national income and the tax base. The degree to which this 
should be done is bigger if the minister of finance is more prudent, the variance and persistence of 
shocks hitting national income and the tax base are large, and the level of the tax rate and the 
unemployment benefit are large. The principle of precautionary taxation thus requires that the tax 
rate is set higher than it would have been done otherwise. Similarly, as a precaution the level of 
public spending is set lower. As a result, the minister of finance is more likely to enjoy windfall 
revenues rather than a shortfall of revenues. The government debt is therefore likely to fall over 
time. The associated reduction in debt service permits, depending on political preferences, either 
a gradual reduction in the tax rate, an increase in the public spending or a combination of both. In 
the long run the tax rate converges to zero as public spending is financed by interest income on 
government assets. This is in sharp contrast to the traditional principles of tax smoothing.  
An important advantage of prudent budgetary policy is that it generates peace and quiet 
in the council of ministers. Without prudent forecasts of national income and the tax base, the 
likelihood of unexpected falls in tax receipts and consequent budgetary fights is much bigger. The   22 
ministers then waste a lot of time and energy on squabbling to try to offload the costs of further 
cuts on their colleagues. That time and energy would have been much better spent on important 
policy issues and reforms. With spending ministers squabbling over a common pool of public 
revenues, it is attractive to give the minister of finance at least as much voting rights in the 
cabinet as all the spending ministers combined. This eliminates the intratemporal common-pool 
distortions of an excessively large public sector. The minister of finance should also adopt a 
prudent budgetary policy to avoid spending too soon and taxing too late. This effectively gets rid 
of the intertemporal common-pool distortions. A strong and pessimistic minister of finance can 
thus control the claims of his spending colleagues and avoid excessive debt accumulation.  
It is straightforward to extend the present framework to allow for uncertainty about future 
projections in the actual or desired levels of public spending, future returns on public sector 
capital or future interest on public debt and to allow for more general data generating processes 
for national income and the tax base. It would then be prudent for the minister of finance to 
budget for slightly higher levels of future government spending and the market rate of interest 
and  for  slightly  lower  levels  of  future  financial  returns  on  public  sector  capital  than  the 
mathematically  expected  levels.  Again,  the  minister  of  finance  will  on  average  enjoy  less 
ambitious spending desires and higher returns as well as windfall revenues than budgeted as time 
proceeds and is thus able to gradually cut debt service and the tax rate. It is also easy to allow for 
quadratic costs of adjustment for the stock of public sector capital or the level of government 
spending.  It  is  also  interesting  to  abandon  the  assumption  of  an  exogenous  data  generation 
process for national income and allow for adverse effects of the tax rate on the tax base. The 
marginal cost of taxation is then likely to increase in recessions and fall during booms. This 
strengthens the case for a prudent counter-cyclical policy. Also, the structural unemployment rate 
may be positively affected by taxation. This also strengthens the case for such a prudent policy, 
because  one  does  not  want  to  increase  tax  rates  in  a  recession  as  this  would  increase 
unemployment even further. 
To allow for a general equilibrium setting with fully specified micro-founded behaviour 
of  households  and  firms  and  flexible  wages  and  prices  requires  numerical  approximation 
algorithms that use linear-quadratic approximations of the model and the welfare function at 
every iteration. More interesting is to investigate how measurement errors in the national income 
and the tax base affect the principles of tax smoothing and the optimal determination of public 
debt.  Whittle  (1981,  1990)  shows  that  it  is  possible  to  decouple  the  stages  of  risk-sensitive 
optimal control and optimal prediction with the aid of a risk-sensitive Kalman-Bucy filter. In 
future work we will use these techniques to modify our results on prudent budgetary policy.   23 
Prudence  favours  the  accumulation  of  assets  to  cope  with  future  risk,  but  then  it  is 
optimal to spend less on actions to prevent risk with adverse consequences (e.g., Eeckhoudt and 
Collier (2005)). Similarly, a prudent minister of finance who has accumulated a big buffer is less 
likely to take actions to prevent the tax base from shrinking and is more likely to dish out favours 
towards election eve. It is therefore interesting to further develop the rationale for a strong and 
prudent minister of finance within the context of a political business cycle framework with finite 
election horizons. In practice, newly elected governments adopt a finite horizon, typically the 
period to the next election, and set themselves a target for the final financial deficit or surplus.
11 
The key question is under what conditions prudent budgetary policy improves welfare. We have 
shown that this occurs if the electorate does not ‘forget’ too quickly and gives sufficient weight to 
outcomes  immediately  upon  entering  office.  If  the  electorate  ‘forgets’  quickly,  the  adverse 
welfare effects of short-run political manipulation will dominate the beneficial welfare effects of 
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APPENDIX 
 
SOLUTION OF THE MIN-MAX PROBLEM 
 
The min-max problem with endogenous government spending can be solved as follows. The case 
of exogenous public spending corresponds to c®¥, i.e.  . t t g g =  The Lagrangian is given by: 
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where  lt  and  mt  indicate the  (undiscounted)  shadow  prices  of  government  debt  and  national 
income. This yields from the perspective of time 1, the following first-order conditions: 
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Given that q > 0, we can verify that the first-order conditions indeed characterize a min-max 
solution. Denoting the optimal budgetary outcomes by the superscript B and generalizing to the 
perspective from time t rather than time 1 onwards, we see that the first-order conditions give rise 
to (6¢) and (7¢) or (6) and (7) in the text. 
 
 
PRUDENT BUDGETARY POLICY AND PUBLIC SECTOR ASSETS 
 
We introduce public sector investment it and public sector capital kt (both detrended) and modify 
the government budget constraint as follows: 
 
dt = b dt-1 + gt + it + bt [u + a (1 - yt)] - tt yt + r  kt,  d0 =D0/Y0 given, 
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where r indicates the financial return on public sector capital. If d is the depreciation rate of 
public sector capital, the dynamics of net worth of the public sector vt º kt - dt can be written as: 
 
  vt = b vt-1 + tt yt  - gt  - bt [u + a (1 - yt)] - lt,  lt º (b + d  - r) kt,  v0 =(K0 -D0)/Y0 given, 
 
where losses on public sector capital lt indicate the amount by which the financial return (net of 
depreciation) on those assets falls short of the growth-corrected real interest rate. If there are no 
Ponzi games, the present-value budget constraint of the public sector is: 
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If public sector capital earns a market rate of return, losses are zero and public sector capital can 
be debudgeted from the flow and present-value budget constraints. If the financial return on 
public sector capital net of depreciation falls short of the market rate of interest, lt > 0. In that 
case, public sector capital must contribute to social welfare for otherwise there would be no 
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where  0 t t k k > >  is the bliss level of public sector capital and x > 0. The optimality conditions 
(6¢), (7¢) and (12) and the equation for the budgeted tax base (8²) are as before. The novel feature 
is that the optimal capital stock is given by: 
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The optimum public sector capital stock is thus high if the tax rate and the cost of funds are low. 
It is also high if the return on public sector capital r is high. Upon substitution of this and (6¢), (7¢) 
and (12) into the present-value budget constraint, we obtain: 
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Prudence still requires precautionary taxation. As a result, the expected net wealth of the public 
sector increases  over time. The  government  is  thus  able to  gradually  lower  the tax  rate  and 
increase spending on consumption goods and capital. CESifo Working Paper Series 
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